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Abstract
We examine the effect of group size of minorities on their representation in national gov-
ernment under majoritarian (MR) and proportional (PR) electoral systems. We first
establish a robust empirical regularity using an ethnicity-country level panel data com-
prising 438 ethno-country minority groups across 102 democracies spanning the period
1946–2013. We show that a minority group’s population share has no relation with its
absolute representation in the national executive under PR but has an inverted-U shaped
relation under MR. The pattern is stable over time and robust to alternate specifications.
The developmental outcomes for a group proxied using stable nightlight emissions in a
group’s settlement area follow the same pattern. We reproduce the main results by two
separate identification strategies—(i) instrumenting colony’s voting system by that of the
primary colonial ruler and, (ii) comparing the same ethnicity across countries within a
continent. We argue that existing theoretical framework with a two group set up is not
able to explain this pattern. Our proposed model incorporates the spatial distribution of
multiple minority groups in a probabilistic voting model and justifies these patterns as
equilibrium behavior. The data further validate a critical assumption of the model and its
additional comparative static results. Our work highlights that electoral systems can have
important effects on power inequality across minorities, and consequently, their well-being.
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1 Introduction
Representation of ethnic groups in democratic governments is an important determinant
of their welfare. This is especially true for minorities as they are understandably more
vulnerable to exclusion. The African Americans in the US prior to 1965, for example,
were de facto disenfranchised from the electoral process through the use of various re-
strictions on voter registration. Many minorities across the world have similarly been
actively excluded from the political process by the state. The Kurds in Turkey, the
Somalis in Kenya, and the Romas in many European countries, for example, continue
to be discriminated against by the government. Sustained exclusion, consequently, may
breed resentment among minority group members against the government, and there-
fore, may increase the likelihood of the group engaging in armed conflict against the
state (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). The case of Irish Catholic uprising against
the political discrimination by the British government that led to Irish independence
and the Zapatista movement in Mexico during 1990s led by the Chiapas indigenous
group are important examples of how prolonged political exclusion of minority groups
can destabilize democracies (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009).
Political representation of minorities in national governments, on the other
hand, creates an institutional arrangement for the groups to voice their interests and
desires to the government.1 Therefore, political representation of groups in general, and
minorities specifically, may facilitate a more peaceful, stable and competitive democracy.
Importantly, political representation has been unequal across minorities, even
within a democracy. Our data show that only a third of minority groups have any
representation in democracies during the post–World War II period and only about
half of the variation in political representation can be explained by differences across
countries. In contrast, the “majority” group in a country is almost always represented.2
1Political representation, for example, has been linked to various measures of positive political out-
comes for minority groups. Previous works show that representation fosters trust and approval in
government decision-making (Banducci, Donovan and Karp, 2004), engenders greater political partic-
ipation among the group’s members (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990), and consequently, improves allocation
of public resources towards them (see Cascio and Washington, 2013 for the case of African Americans
in the US and Besley, Pande and Rao, 2004, 2007 etc., for the case of minority caste and tribe groups
in Indian village governments).
2We define the largest group in any country to be the majority group in that country. This definition
allows us to include countries which do not have a group with absolute majority. More than 80% of the
majority groups in our sample indeed have absolute majority in their respective countries. Our results,
both empirical and theoretical, do not change if we restrict attention to countries where the largest
group has absolute majority.
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In this context it may be useful to ask whether different electoral institutions
create different incentives for political parties to represent some minorities but not oth-
ers, and to what extent the size of a group matters for this consideration. In this
paper we examine this issue by looking at how population share of minorities affects
their probability of being represented in the national government, and how this relation
depends on the electoral system. We focus on two broad categories of electoral sys-
tems—majoritarian (MR), where elections are typically contested over single member
districts, and proportional representation (PR), where seats are allocated to parties in
proportion to their vote share in multimember districts.
We answer the research question in three steps. First, we use a recently released
ethnicity level panel dataset comprising over a 100 democracies and establish a robust
causal relationship between group size and political representation of minorities. We
show that under PR, group size of minorities has no effect on their representation in the
national government, whereas it has an inverted U-shaped effect under MR. Importantly,
we use nightlight emissions per unit area in a group’s settlement area as a proxy for (per
capita) developmental outcome of the group to show that it also follows the same pattern.
In the second step, we build a theoretical framework which models spatial distribution
of multiple minority groups in a two party probabilistic voting model and justifies these
patterns as equilibrium outcome. Finally, we go back to the data and provide evidence
validating our model. We do this by verifying one critical assumption of the model and
testing some of its additional comparative static results.
The aforementioned result is in sharp contrast to the theoretical predictions of
Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008) who study a similar problem in the context of US
municipalities following the Voting Rights Act, 1965. They model the representation
of two groups—the white majority and the black minority in U.S. cities and compare
the welfare levels across the two electoral systems for minorities of varying sizes. In
their model access to power for minorities never falls with population share within any
electoral system and eventually increases in PR. We show that this apparently intuitive
result gets modified in presence of multiple minorities. Since we are concerned with
representation in national governments, the assumption of multiple minorities seems
reasonable in our context. Our results imply that when more than two groups are
present in a MR country, there is an “optimal” size of a minority group above which its
political representation begins to fall. On the other hand, group size has no bearing on
political representation in a PR system. Our contribution lies in showing the generality
of this result across space and over time and providing a theoretical understanding that
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undergirds this empirical finding.
For the empirical analysis, we combine several datasets, including the Ethnic
Power Relations (EPR) dataset, to create a group-country level panel dataset. The fi-
nal data we use spans the period 1946–2013 and comprises 438 ethno-country minority
groups in 102 democratic countries. It contains various group level political outcomes
and demographic details along with information about political systems of their respec-
tive countries for each year in our sample period. Most importantly for us, the EPR
dataset provides a power status variable that codes each group’s level of access to the
national executive of the country in each year. There are six primary power statuses
for any group, as coded by the data, indicating the degree of representation enjoyed by
the group in the government. These are, in the descending order of power, monopoly,
dominant, senior partner, junior partner, powerless and discriminated by the state. We
define a group to be politically included if its power status is not coded as powerless or
discriminated.3 As indicated above, minorities on average are politically included only
in about one-third of the cases compared to 94% for the majorities. Evidently, political
inclusion in the government is an important marker of power for the minorities. We,
therefore, use this indicator as our main dependent variable.
We do the analysis using a linear probability model and compare groups within a
country-year observation. The result shows a statistically significant inverted U-shaped
relationship between population share and political inclusion under MR and no relation-
ship under PR. The predicted optimum population share for minorities in MR countries
is estimated to be 0.260. The result survives a number of robustness checks, namely (i)
doing the analysis across both halves of the time period separately (indicating that the
relationship has not changed much over time) and only for the year 2013 which is the last
year in the sample; (ii) using population share as a fraction of the population share of
the largest group in the country-year observation as the main explanatory variable; (iii)
restricting sample to countries where the largest group has an absolute majority; (iv)
restricting sample only to parliamentary democracies; (v) restricting sample to election
years only; (vi) restricting the sample only to countries that are classified in the Polity
IV project as full democracies i.e. countries with a polity score of at least 7; (vii) using
the original ordered power rank variable as the dependent variable.4
We then test if the developmental outcomes of the groups follow the same pattern.
3Stated otherwise, a group is included if its power status is one of the following: monopoly, dominant,
senior partner, or junior partner.
4Power rank is coded as an integer from 1 to 6 where 1 corresponds to being being discriminated, 2
to being powerless and so on.
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Since data on income or allocation of public resources is not available at the level of
groups within countries, we use (logarithm of) nightlight luminosity per unit area in
a group’s settlement area as a proxy for per capita level of development of the group.
Using this as our dependent variable we show that it replicates the same pattern. This
gives support to our claim that electoral systems do have a real bearing on how group
size affects political representation of minorities, and consequently, their well-being.
However, interpreting this pattern as a causal relationship can be problematic.
Firstly, the electoral system of a country is not exogenously given. Political actors
in positions of power may strategically choose electoral systems that maximize their
chances of winning, as Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008) show in the context of US
municipalites. This means that the electoral system at the time of democratization of a
country, and even changes in it later may depend on existing distribution of power across
the groups (Colomer, 2004; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). We attempt to address this
endogeneity issue by looking at countries which were once colonized. Consistent with
Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis (2008), we show that electoral systems of the former colonial
rulers systematically predicts electoral system of the colonies post independence.5 We,
therefore, use this as an instrument for the electoral system of a colony. The exclusion
restriction requires that the electoral system of the colonial ruler does not have a direct
effect on the group politics in the colonies post-independence. The two-stage-least-
squares estimates replicate our results for both political representation and nightlight
luminosity.
One potential criticism of the IV specification is that it takes the group sizes
within a country as exogenous. However, there might be unobserved characteristics of
groups that can affect their population share as well as access to power in the national
executive. For example, there might be cultural and geographic factors which could
make a group economically successful, and affect its size and political power at the same
time. To address this we use an alternative strategy where we compare a group present
in more than one country within a continent and exploit the plausibly exogenous vari-
ation in its population share by using group-region-year fixed effects.6 In this strategy,
the variation comes primarily from a group falling unequally on the two sides of the
5We restrict our sample to colonies which democratized not too long after gaining independence.
We use a maximum lag of 30 and 50 years between gaining independence and democratization for our
analysis. We do this to improve the predictive power of the first stage. See Sections 4.1 and 5.2 for a
detailed discussion about this.
6A region as defined in our data is essentially a continent.
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national boundary.7 This strategy restricts our sample to only those groups which are
located in more than one country and consequently, our sample size falls drastically, by
more than 80%. Even in the reduced sample, however, we find a statistically significant
inverted U-shaped relation in MR and no relation in PR for political representation.
The predicted optimal population share estimates under MR in both the identification
strategies remain virtually identical. Importantly, the nightlight regressions have statis-
tically significant coefficients in this specification and mirror the pattern observed for
political representation.
The existing theoretical framework is unable to explain our empirical findings,
as we have indicated above. We, therefore, propose a model of electoral competition
between two parties in a probabilistic voting setup to contrast PR and MR elections.
Importantly, we allow for multiple minorities in our model. Political parties promise rep-
resentation to each group as platforms during elections. This determines the per capita
private transfer of government resources targeted towards group members. This readily
implies that in PR, where parties essentially maximize votes, all minorities irrespective
of their size are equally represented. There are two opposing forces in action that deliver
this result; though offering higher representation to the larger group gets a party more
votes, it is cheaper for a party to attract a higher share of voters from a smaller group.
The result follows from the observation that when representations are equal, these two
forces balance each other out across groups.
In MR, on the other hand, parties want to win electoral districts and hence,
they have to consider settlement patterns of groups across districts, i.e., over space. We
postulate that area occupied by a minority group has a concave relationship with its
population share. This implies that for a majority group of a given population share,
if the minority groups are unequal in their population shares, they in aggregate would
occupy less area than if they were all equally sized. Therefore, if minority groups are
too unequal in size (i.e., say, one “too small” and one “too large”), they both suffer a
geographical disadvantage against the majority group in MR. This is at the core of
the inverted U-shaped result that emerges as the equilibrium in our model. We show
evidence in favor of our concavity assumption in the data and test some additional
comparative static results that the model delivers regarding the exact shape of the
inverted-U relationship.
Our work is related to the large literature that examines the effect of electoral
7Dimico (2016) uses a similar identification strategy to identify the effect of group size on its level
of economic performance in the African continent.
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systems on public policy and other political outcomes. Myerson (1999) and Persson
and Tabellini (2002) discuss and extensively review the literature on theoretical aspects
of electoral systems. Empirically, some of the important outcome variables that have
been studied with regard to effects of electoral systems are corruption (Kunicova and
Ackerman, 2005), public attitude towards democracy (Banducci, Donovan and Karp,
1999), voter turnout (Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey, 2014; Kartal, 2014), and incentive
to engage in conflict (Fjelde and Hoglund, 2014). Some papers such as Moser, 2008 and
Wagner, 2014 have compared differences in the level of minority representation across the
two systems by exploiting their variation over space and time in specific countries (Russia
and Macedonia, respectively). In both cases the authors argue that settlement pattern
of minorities is an important factor to consider when analyzing change in minority
representation when electoral systems changed. Our analysis also highlights this concern
and pins down the exact nature of this influence, both theoretically and empirically.
Moreover, while these papers are interested in the level of power enjoyed by minorities,
our paper additionally focuses on difference in the slope of the relationship between group
size and political power across electoral systems. This allows us to look at differential
access to power received by minority groups of differing sizes within a system. Our
result, consequently, has important implications for power inequality across minorities.
It suggests that PR creates lower power inequality between minority groups, and their
welfare inequality presumably is also minimal as a consequence. The implication for
inequality in the MR system is more nuanced. Our result suggests that small and large
minorities might enjoy similar level of power in MR countries while the mid-sized groups
enjoy a greater access to the government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the two
electoral institutions that we consider and their evolution during the post-war period,
section 3 elaborates on the various datasets used and summarizes the main variables,
section 4 explains the empirical methodology and the identification strategy, and section
5 discusses the results. We then develop the model in section 6 and verify its assumptions
and additional predictions in section 7. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Electoral Systems in Democracies
The decline of colonialism and autocratic rule, and a transition towards democracy has
characterized the world in the post World War II period. An interesting aspect of this
wave of democratization is the choice of electoral system made by the newly emerging
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Figure 1: Electoral system distribution in 2013
democracies. On one hand we have the MR system in which elections are typically
contested over single member districts. The candidate or party with a plurality or an
absolute majority in a district wins and the party with majority of districts forms the
government. Proponents of this system claim that it helps in formation of a strong and
accountable government (Norris, 1997). Among MR systems, single member district
plurality (SMDP)—where individuals cast vote for one candidate in single member dis-
trict and the candidate with the most votes is elected—is the most common. SMDP
system is currently followed for legislative elections in countries such as India, Nigeria
and United Kingdom among others. Around 63% of country-year observations that fol-
low MR have this system in our dataset.8 In contrast, in the PR system, parties present
list of candidates and seats are allocated to parties in proportion to their vote share in
multimember districts. This reduces the disparity in vote share at the national level and
the seat share of a party in the parliament. Examples of countries that currently have
PR system are Argentina, Belgium, South Africa and Turkey among others.9
Colonialism has played a major role in the choice of electoral system. Most of
8Another variant of MR systems is a two-round system (TRS). In TRS candidates or parties are
elected in the first round if their proportion of votes exceeds a specified threshold. Otherwise, a second
round of elections takes place, typically one or two weeks later, among the top candidates. France and
Mali currently employ TRS for parliamentary elections.
9Some countries also use mixed systems which are a combination of both MR and PR. However, we
do not include them in our empirical analysis.
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the countries that were once British and French colonies adopted the MR system while
those that had been colonized by Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain adopted
PR. Patterns of colonization and the effect of influential neighbors have resulted in a
regional clustering of the systems as shown in figure 1.
Figure 2: Electoral systems by decade
From 1950s to the 1970s, a larger fraction of countries had the MR system.
However, the past few decades have seen a trend towards the adoption of PR. This
can be observed in figure 2, where we plot the number of country-year observations
by electoral system for each decade from 1950s through 2000s. This is mostly driven
by adoption of the PR system by the new democracies in Latin America, Africa, and
Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.10 Several countries
have also changed their existing systems to electoral formulas that are more proportional.
For example, Japan and New Zealand switched from MR and held their first general
elections under a mixed system in 1996. Another case in point is Russia, which changed
its mixed electoral system and employed PR for the 2007 legislative election.11
The pattern of transition towards PR across the world has not been accom-
panied by a substantive political inclusion of minorities. This is shown in figure 3, in
which we plot the proportion of minority groups in democracies in each power status
category during 1946–2013. As figure 3 shows, there has been a gradual decline in state
10The possible reasons for adoption of PR system by these countries are discussed in Farrell (2011).
11Other examples include Argentina, Sri Lanka and Moldova which switched directly from MR to
PR for their parliamentary elections held in 1963, 1989 and 1998 respectively. There have also been
a few instances of changes in the opposite direction—i.e. towards less proportionality. These include
Venezuela, Madagascar and Bulgaria where PR was replaced in favor of mixed system in 1993, 1998
and 2009 legislative elections respectively.
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Figure 3: Minority power status over time
administered discrimination against minorities over the years. However, the share of
groups in the powerless category has correspondingly increased. There is also no clear
pattern in the proportion of groups in power sharing arrangements with other groups
(i.e., junior and senior partner) and of those who rule virtually alone (dominant and
monopoly groups). While this proportion was increasing during 1990s, it has remained
virtually stable afterwards and was in fact declining during some of the earlier decades.
3 Data Description
In this section, we describe the various data sources that we have put together for this
project and discuss the main variables that concern us.
3.1 Data Sources
3.1.1 EPR Dataset
Our primary source of data is the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) core dataset 2014
(Vogt et al., 2015). The dataset contains various characteristics of well-identified groups
(“ethnicities") within countries for about 155 countries across the world at an annual level
for the period 1946–2013. The dataset defines a group “as any subjectively experienced
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sense of commonality based on the belief in common ancestry and shared culture."12
(Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010)
The dataset reports various group level characteristics for all politically relevant
groups residing in sovereign states with a total population of at least 500,000 in 1990. A
group is politically relevant if at least one political organization has at least once claimed
to represent it at the national level or the group has been explicitly discriminated against
by the state during any time in the period 1946–2013. It provides annual group-country
level data on population shares, settlement patterns, trans-border ethnic kinship, as
well as religious and linguistic affiliations for the period 1946–2013. However, most
importantly for us, it also codes a group’s access to national executive. A group’s access
to absolute power in the national government is coded based on whether the group rules
alone (power status = monopoly, dominant), shares power with other groups (power
status = senior partner, junior partner) or is excluded from executive power (power
status = powerless, discriminated by the state). We rank these six categories in a separate
variable called “power rank”; they range from 6 to 1 in decreasing order of power (i.e.,
from monopoly to discriminated).13 The EPR dataset also provides information about
the settlement patterns of the groups. Specifically, it categorizes the groups as being
dispersed, i.e., those who do not inhabit any particular region and, concentrated, i.e.,
settled in a particular region of the country which is easily distinguishable on a map.
For concentrated groups, it further gives information about the country’s land area (km2)
that they occupy.14
The EPR dataset was created by scholars who work on group based conflict. The
first version of the dataset was created as part of a research project between scholars
at ETH Zurich and University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), which was then
updated and released by Vogt et al. (2015). The information about the attributes of
groups, including their power status is coded by the researchers by taking inputs from
about one hundred country experts. This consultation period lasted about two years
12Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) further point out that in different countries different "markers
may be used to indicate such shared ancestry and culture: common language, similar phenotypical
features, adherence to the same faith, and so on." Further, in some societies there may be multiple
dimensions of identity along which such “sense of commonality” may be experienced. The dataset,
however, is concerned with groups that are politically relevant (more on this later) and that aligns with
our interest as well. As long as there is some marker of identity which is salient in the society and is
also politically meaningful, our analysis should be applicable.
13There is an additional categorization in the data, known as self-exclusion. This applies to groups
which have declared independence from the central state. They constitute only 0.7% of our sample and
we do not consider them in our analysis.
14The GIS shape file of their area of settlement is also provided on the EPR website.
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through multiple workshops. It was then followed by a final workshop where the final
coding of attributes was decided after taking into account the inputs provided by the
experts and accumulated knowledge available for the countries.
This dataset has certain advantages for our paper over other existing datasets
about political outcomes of groups. Some of the prominent datasets used by scholars
of conflict are the Minorities At Risk (MAR) dataset, the All Minorities at Risk (A-
MAR) dataset and the dataset used by Fearon (2003). Though most of these datasets
give information about group sizes, none of the datasets provide any detail about the
settlement patterns of the groups. This is critical for us since we demonstrate that the
pattern observed in our data is driven by groups which are geographically concentrated.
Also, the EPR dataset provides information about the power status of all groups; this
is in contrast to the MAR dataset which systematically excludes the groups that are in
the government.
3.1.2 Electoral systems and polity characteristics
The data for electoral rules used for national elections come from merging two datasets.
The first of these is the Democratic Electoral Systems (DES) data compiled by Bormann
and Golder (2013). It contains details about electoral systems used for about 1200
national elections for the period 1946–2011. We complement this with a second source
of data—the IDEA Electoral System Design Database, which gives us information about
the electoral systems for some additional countries. The classification into broad electoral
systems is based on the DES dataset. For any given year, the electoral system in a
country is the electoral system used in the most recently held election. We restrict
our analysis to Majoritarian and Proportional systems. Polity IV Project allows us to
identify periods of autocratic and democratic rule in a country. We define democracy as
country-year pairs where the position of the chief executive is chosen through competitive
elections and include only those observations in the sample.15
3.1.3 Colonial history
The ICOW Colonial History Dataset 1.0 compiled by Hensel (2014) recognizes the pri-
mary colonial ruler and the year of independence for each country that was colonized.
To obtain the electoral systems of the colonial rulers we use the data on electoral systems
provided in The Handbook of Electoral System Choice (HESC) (Colomer, 2004). The
15We show robustness of our result using a different definition of democracy based on the polity score.
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HESC provides information about electoral systems of democracies since 1800. We use
this to find the electoral rule followed by the primary colonial ruler in the colony’s year
of independence. We use this information for our instrumental variable analysis which
we describe later.
3.2 Summary statistics
Appendix table A1 reports summary statistics for both the ethnicity level (Panel A) and
the country level (Panel B) variables. In our final data, 43.87 percent of country-year
observations have MR system, whereas 56.13 percent have PR system. The countries
with the MR system are more fractionalized, have greater number of relevant groups,
but allow lesser political competition and place fewer constraints on decision making
powers of the chief executive compared to the PR system. These differences, however,
are not statistically significant at 10% level. On an average, the largest group comprises
of 73.5 percent of the politically relevant population and in 84.9 percent of country-year
observations, the largest group has an absolute majority in the country (i.e., population
share over 50 per cent). Overall 36.6 percent of minorities are politically included and
78.4 percent are geographically concentrated. The ethnicity level characteristics are also
not significantly different between countries with MR and PR systems.
4 Empirical Methodology
We use the linear probability model to estimate the effect of group size on political
inclusion under MR and PR. In the baseline specification we first check if the population
share of a group has any relationship with its probability of being included in the national
executive and whether the relationship is different across the two electoral systems. The
following is our preferred specification:
P[Iict = 1] = δct + β1nict + β2n2ict + β3Pct ∗ nict + β4Pct ∗ n2ict + γXict + c (1)
where Iict is a dummy indicating whether the group i is politically included in country
c in year t, δct denotes country-year fixed effects, nict is the population share of the group,
Pct is a dummy indicating whether the proportional electoral system has been used in the
latest national elections in country c in year t; Xict is a vector of ethnicity level controls
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(which include years of peace, settlement patterns, trans-ethnic kin inclusion/exclusion
and fraction of the group associated with the largest language and religion in the group).
The error term c is clustered at the country level. We include a square term for the
population share of the group to check for non-linearity in the relationship. Given this
specification, we compare groups within a country-year observation. We argue that two
groups of the same size across two different countries may wield different political power,
partly because a group’s access to state power may depend on the size composition
of all the groups present in the country. Also, it may depend on other historical and
cultural factors as well, which may depend on time varying characteristics of the country
which are often hard to observe. Therefore, by comparing groups within a country-year
observation we are able to control for all the potentially time-varying as well as time
invariant country-level characteristics which may affect a group’s political representation.
An alternative, though imperfect, way of estimating the relationship would be
to compare the same minority over time, by exploiting its temporal change in population
share and political inclusion status. The specification could be written as:
P[Iict = 1] = δic + φt + β1nict + β2n2ict + β3Pct ∗ nict + β4Pct ∗ n2ict + γXict + ic (2)
where δic is a group-country fixed effect and φt is a year fixed effect. However, there are
two important drawbacks in this estimation strategy. Firstly, the population share of all
groups change over time. As already mentioned, population composition of other groups,
including the majority group, may have important implication for political inclusion of
a group. More importantly, there are unobservable political factors in the country that
can change over the years which may also affect the likelihood of political inclusion
of the group, as we argue above. The direction of this effect is uncertain as it would
depend on the nature of the change in the political climate of the country. Therefore,
the coefficients β1–β4 are likely to have noisier estimates. Since this is not our preferred
empirical specification, we discuss the results in the Appendix section B.
4.1 Identification I: IV Strategy
The baseline specification treats the electoral system of a country as exogenous. However,
Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008) show in the context of US municipalities that choice
of electoral system can be endogenous to the size distribution of groups. If such concerns
are true at the level of countries then our interaction terms in specification (1) would
be misidentified. There is a small number of countries that switch from one electoral
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system to the other during the sample period. However, such switches themselves could
be endogenous as they could be precipitated by the discontent of some of the groups with
the current distribution of power. We, therefore, propose to look at a subset of countries
which had once been colonies. We use the electoral system of their primary colonial
ruler at the time of the colony’s independence as an instrument for the colony’s current
electoral system. Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis (2008) argue that a lot of the colonies
adopted the electoral system of their colonial ruler. Therefore, this could potentially
work as an instrument for our purpose. The exclusion restriction for this specification
requires that the electoral system of the colonialists did not directly differentially affect
the political power of groups of different sizes.
We keep in the sample only those colonies which democratized not too long
after gaining independence from their colonial ruler. Some countries, such as Indonesia
and Brazil, became dictatorships after gaining independence and remained so for many
decades before becoming democracies. In such cases the colonial ruler’s electoral system
is going to matter much less for a country. For example, there are 7 countries which
democratized at least 50 years after becoming independent.16 Only one of them have
the MR system even though all except one were colonized by countries with the PR
system. We use two thresholds for our selection of sample: countries which democratized
within 30 and 50 years of getting independent.17 We first run the following first stage
regressions:
Pct ∗ nict = dct + a1nict + a2n2ict + a3Hc ∗ nict+ a4Hcn2ict + piXict + uc
Pct ∗ n2ict = ect + b1nict + b2n2ict + b3Hc ∗ nict+ b4Hcn2ict + ωXict + vc
where Hc = 1, if colonialist of country c had the proportional system in the colony’s
year of independence. We then get the estimates of β1–β4 from specification (1) in the
second stage regression.
4.2 Identification II: Comparing Same Group Across Countries
The IV strategy treats the population shares of groups as exogenous. However, there
could be unobservable cultural and geographic factors which may affect the level of
economic development of some groups which may impact both its size as well as its
access to state power. In such cases the regression would suffer from omitted variable
16These countries are Bhutan, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Nicaragua and Panama.
17There are 18 countries which democratized over 30 years after becoming independent. Of them 9
have the PR system, though only 2 countries were colonized by countries with a PR system.
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bias. Also, the IV specification allows us to identify the slopes of the relationship between
group size and political representation across two types of countries. It, however, doesn’t
identify the intercept of the relationship. We adopt a second identification strategy
which attempts address the endogeneity issue and identifies both the slope as well as the
intercept. For this identification, we notice that sometimes a group is present in more
than one country and often those countries are in the same continent or region. Examples
include the Kurds who are present in both Turkey and Iran, and the Basques present
in France and Spain, etc. Therefore, we exploit the differences in the sizes of the same
group across those countries to identify the effect of group size. When the countries
have different electoral systems (as in the case of France and Spain), the differential
effect of electoral systems could also be estimated by comparing the group across those
countries. To implement this strategy we restrict our sample to groups living in more
than one country in the same continent and estimate the following model:
P[Iict = 1] = δirt + θPct + β1nict + β2n2ict + β3Pct ∗ nict + β4Pct ∗ n2ict + γXict + ic (3)
where δirt denotes ethnicity-region-year fixed effects, error term ic is double clustered at
the level of group and country to adjust standard errors against potential auto-correlation
within group and country. The coefficient θ now is the intercept of the relationship and
β1–β4 are our other coefficients of interest, as before. By comparing the same group
across countries within a region we account for any region specific historical factor,
including the prevalent political power of the group at the time of the creation of the
countries, that may have been important for the differences in its sizes. Moreover, the
identification strategy covers countries across continents and hence acts as a robustness
exercise for the estimates found using the IV strategy.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline results
Table 1, column (4) shows the results from our baseline specification. The coefficient
of population share is positive and significant at 1% level and coefficient of population
share-squared is negative and significant at 5% level. The magnitudes of the coefficients
imply that for the countries with MR system there is an inverted U-shaped relation
between population share of a group and its probability of political inclusion. Probability
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Table 1: Inverted U-shaped relation under MR and no relation under PR
Political inclusion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β1: Population share 2.839*** 2.198*** 4.405*** 4.825***
(0.450) (0.279) (1.239) (1.227)
β2: Population share - squared -7.884** -9.276**
(3.883) (3.955)
β3: Proportional*Population share -1.503*** -1.205** -3.011* -3.661**
(0.559) (0.489) (1.687) (1.721)
β4: Proportional*Population share - squared 6.903 9.106*
(5.159) (5.313)
Proportional 0.216* 0.195 0.247*
(0.126) (0.126) (0.144)
H0 : β1 + β3 = 0 (p-value) .000 .022 .231 .325
H0 : β2 + β4 = 0 (p-value) – – .774 .960
Predicted optimal size – – 0.279 0.260
Mean inclusion 0.367 0.367 0.366 0.366
Observations 9,304 9,294 9,294 8,706
R-squared 0.591 0.645 0.652 0.687
Group-year controls NO YES YES YES
Country-year controls NO YES YES NO
Country FE YES YES YES NO
Year FE YES YES YES NO
Country-year FE NO NO NO YES
Notes: Data is at the level of ethnicity-country-year. Only minorities are part of the sample.
There are 87 countries and 421 ethno-country groups for the period 1946–2013 in column (4). Po-
litical inclusion is a dummy variable that takes value one if the group in a country in a given year
is neither powerless nor discriminated by the state. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
of political inclusion attains its peak when the population share is 0.260. The interactions
of population share and its square with the proportional system dummy are statistically
significant (at 5% level) and have opposite signs. F-tests for the hypotheses β1 + β3 = 0
and β2 + β4 = 0 give p-values of .325 and .960 respectively. This indicates that there
is no relation between population share and political inclusion under the PR system.
The results reported in columns (1) and (2) are with weaker specifications and include
only the linear term for population share. Column (1) includes country and year fixed
effects separately and doesn’t include any control at the level of groups or country-
year. Column (2) reports the same coefficients when these controls are added to the
regression. In both cases we see that the relationship between population share and
political inclusion is much weaker in PR compared to MR. However, we do find that
with the linear specification there is a statistically significant positive relationship in
PR system. This result, however, goes away once the squared terms are included to
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allow for non-linearity in the relationship, as we see in column (3). Importantly, in
column (3) the dummy for proportional system has a positive and marginally significant
coefficient. This suggests that very small minority groups presumably enjoy higher
political representation under PR compared to the MR system.
The coefficients of ethnicity level controls in the same regressions are reported in
appendix table A2. These coefficients are of the expected sign. The coefficient of peace
years is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. An additional decade without
any conflict incidence experienced by an ethnicity is associated with 4.15 percent more
likelihood of its political inclusion. The coefficient of transethnic-kin exclusion dummy
is positive and significant. This might be due to the fact that politically excluded ethnic
groups sometimes migrate to countries where they might get political representation.
An indicator of an ethnic group’s cohesiveness is the fraction of its members associated
with the largest language spoken in the group. Groups that are linguistically more
cohesive find it easier to organize themselves and put forth their demands. Therefore,
they are more likely to be politically included. This is supported by the result that a
10 percentage points increase in fraction of group members associated with the largest
language for the group is related with a 2.10 percent increase in likelihood of political
inclusion for the group. The coefficient is significant at 1% level. This shows that our
measure of political representation, though based on subjective evaluation of experts, is
nonetheless meaningful.
Table A3 reports the results of various robustness exercises we carry out to
ensure that the result is not driven by any specific subsample of the data. Columns (1)
and (2) show results for two time periods 1946–1979 and 1980–2013, respectively. The
broad patterns depicted in our baseline specification continue to hold over time, though
the coefficients are larger for the earlier period, indicating a more pronounced inverted-U
relationship for MR countries in the first half of the post–war period. Column (3) shows
the cross-sectional result for the latest year in our sample i.e. 2013. The coefficients
here are quite similar to the column (1) coefficients. In column (4) we replace the main
explanatory variable to the relative population share, i.e., the ratio of population share to
the population share of the largest group in the country-year observation. Columns (5)
restricts the sample to countries with an absolute majority and column (6) restricts the
sample to parliamentary democracies only. In column (7) we only include election years
in the sample and column (8) includes countries which are full democracies according to
the Polity IV dataset (i.e., countries with a polity score of at least 7). Finally, in column
(9) we use the power rank variable as our dependent variable. The variable takes value
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1 through 6 with 1 being discriminated, 2 powerless and so on. In all specifications we
fail to reject that β1+β3 = 0 and β2+β4 = 0. Therefore, in all specifications we get that
there is no relation between population share and political inclusion in a PR system.
Similarly, in all specifications we get that the relationship is inverted U-shaped in the
MR system, though the coefficient β2 is noisily estimated in some specifications. The
consistency of the pattern across various sub-samples of the data strongly suggests that
the result is a general phenomenon observed across democracies.
One may argue that our measure of political inclusion is subjective in nature,
and therefore, any pattern observed in it may not reflect the actual well-being of groups.
It is, therefore, important for us to show whether the same pattern is replicated when
we look at an objective measure of developmental outcome of groups. However, data
on income or allocation of public resources at the level of ethnic groups across countries
is hard to get. We get around this problem by using nightlight intensity as a proxy for
the level of economic development for groups which are settled in a geographically well
demarcated region within a country.18 Nightlight luminosity is now a well-documented
and widely used proxy for the level of economic development of any geographic region,
especially for subnational regions for which income data is not readily available across
a wide range of countries.19 We use (logarithm of) nightlight intensity per unit area as
our dependent variable to test the specification (1).20 The use of nightlight luminosity
as our measure imposes two restrictions in the data—it is available only from 1992
onwards and can be used only for groups which have a well-demarcated and contiguous
settlement area as specified by the EPR dataset. Table 2 column (2) reports the results.
Column (4) shows the results when the group population share is replaced by the relative
population share as defined above. Both the columns show that the result for political
inclusion is replicated with nightlight as outcome variable. The estimated population
share with peak nightlight intensity is 0.21 which is similar to what we estimated for
political inclusion. Moreover, we see in columns (1) and (3) that even with just linear
terms we find that group size strongly predicts nightlight per unit area in MR countries,
18The GeoEPR database provides GIS maps of the settlement areas for these groups (see Wucherpfen-
nig, 2011).
19For a discussion about using nightlight luminosity as a measure of economic activity see Doll (2008)
and Henderson et al. (2012). The papers using nightlight data as a proxy for economic development
in various contexts are too numerous to cite here. The papers that use nightlight data to answer
political economy related questions include among others, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013, 2014),
Prakash, Rockmore and Uppal (2015), Baskaran et al. (2015), Alesina et al. (2016) etc.
20We add 0.01 as a constant to nightlight intensity per area measure before taking the logarithm to
include observations with zeros.
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Table 2: Nightlight emissions follow the same patterns
ln(Nightlight per area)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β1: Population share 3.471** 11.02***
(1.490) (3.840)
β2: Population share - squared -24.49**
(11.30)
β3: Proportional*Population share -2.763 -10.11
(1.787) (6.103)
β4: Proportional*Population share - squared 24.29
(16.17)
(β1): Relative population share 1.438** 6.046***
(0.662) (1.808)
(β2): Relative population share-squared -6.653**
(2.601)
(β3): Proportional*relative population share -1.167 -4.405
(0.824) (2.855)
(β4): Proportional*relative population share-squared 4.954
(3.804)
H0 : β1 + β3 = 0 (p-value) 0.53 0.86 0.59 0.52
H0 : β2 + β4 = 0 (p-value) – 0.99 – 0.58
Predicted optimal size – 0.214 – –
Observations 3,469 3,469 3,469 3,469
R-squared 0.812 0.816 0.811 0.818
Ethnicity-year controls YES YES YES YES
Country-year FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Data is at the level of ethnicity-country-year. Only minorities are part of the sample. The
dependent variable is logarithm of nightlight luminosity per unit area of groups which have well-
demarcated settlement areas. Relative population share is the ratio of population share of the group
and the population share of the largest group in the country-year observation. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
but there is very weak and statistically insignificant relationship between them in PR
countries. This suggests that the patterns of political inclusion indeed have implications
for the level of economic development of the groups.
5.2 Identification results
The IV results are reported in table 3. Panel B of the table shows that the presence
of proportional electoral system in a country is 47 percent more likely in countries that
democratized within 30 years of independence if the electoral system of its primary
colonial ruler was also proportional in the colony’s year of independence. The coefficient
is statistically significant at 1% level. Panel A reports the second stage results using
political inclusion dummy and log of nightlight intensity per unit area as the dependent
20
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variables. The first two columns report the results for countries which democratized
within 30 years of being independent and the next two columns report the same with a 50
year threshold. In all the four columns we find the same pattern. For MR countries we get
a strong inverted-U shaped relationship. The peak is achieved at population shares 0.22
and 0.24 for political inclusion and 0.22 and 0.26 for nightlight intensity, for the 30 and 50
year threshold regressions respectively. Moreover, the table shows that the relationships
are indeed flat for PR, as both the tests of β1+β3 = 0 and β2+β4 = 0 fail to reject the null
hypothesis for all the four columns. The coefficients for political inclusion across columns
(1) and (3) are similar in magnitudes and comparable to the coefficients estimated in the
baseline specification (table 1, column (4)). Importantly, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM
statistic for the first stage regressions are high in all specifications, alleviating concerns
related to underidentification. The F statistics for the two first stage regressions are also
very large in magnitudes in each of the cases. Finally, for the sake of transparency, we
report in appendix table A4 the IV strategy results when we do not put any restrictions
on the sample. Both political inclusion (column 1) and nightlight (column 2) regressions
show an inverted-U shaped relationship for MR countries. We get a flat relationship for
political inclusion in PR countries. For the nightlight regressions, however, the β3 and β4
coefficients have the wrong sign. The column (2) coefficients are also noisy. Importantly,
the regressions don’t pass the underidentification tests as the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM
statistics are low. This suggests that our sample restrictions are indeed useful in making
our specification stronger.
We employ a second identification strategy as described in section 4.2 to test the
robustness of our results. Table 4 reports the coefficients with political inclusion (column
1) and log nightlight intensity per unit area (column 2) as the dependent variables.
Dimico (2016) shows in the context of Africa that the partition of an ethnicity in two
countries adversely affects their political representation when the resulting groups are
small. However, we show that the effect of how an ethnic group is divided in two
democracies on the group’s political representation and economic development depends
on the electoral system. The within group comparison reaffirms the inverted U-shaped
effect of population share on political representation under MR and no relation under PR.
The coefficients reported in column (1) are a bit larger compared to the ones estimated in
the IV regression (table 3). The peak of political representation under MR is achieved at
population shares of 0.20 in this identification strategy, which is similar to the values we
estimated before. We also find that nightlight intensity indeed has the same pattern with
the peak achieved at population share of 0.19 for MR countries. Also, the coefficient of
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Table 4: Comparing same group across countries replicate main results
Political inclusion ln(Nightlight per area)
(1) (2)
β1: Population share 10.44*** 58.54***
(2.424) (13.25)
β2: Population share - squared -26.13*** -156.4***
(6.091) (33.39)
β3: Proportional*Population share -8.269*** -58.72***
(2.686) (14.41)
β4: Proportional*Population share - squared 25.79** 147.7***
(10.96) (39.31)
Proportional 0.138** 0.991**
(0.0513) (0.446)
H0 : β1 + β3 = 0 (p-value) 0.17 0.97
H0 : β2 + β4 = 0 (p-value) 0.96 0.60
Predicted optimal size 0.200 0.187
Observations 1,370 417
R-squared 0.836 0.887
Group-year controls YES YES
Country-year controls YES YES
Group-region-year FE YES YES
Notes: Data is at the level of ethnicity-country-year. Only minorities are part of the sample.
Column (1) compares 21 ethnic groups in 40 countries and column (2) compares 12 ethnic groups
in 30 countries. Standard errors are double clustered at the group and country level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
the Proportional system dummy is positive and significant for both columns, suggesting
that minorities of really small size benefits more from being in the PR system relative
to the MR system. This is also consistent with the baseline result in coumn (3) of
table 1. We plot the marginal effect of population share on political inclusion for the
two identification methods in the appendix figure A6. The figures imply that mid-sized
groups enjoy higher level of political inclusion under MR compared to PR.
6 Model
We now attempt to understand the rationale behind our empirical results. In this section
we develop a probabilistic voting model of electoral competition, based on Persson and
Tabellini (2002), and try to determine the conditions under which the patterns observed
in the data will emerge as equilibrium outcomes.
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6.1 Basic Setup
There are three groups of voters. Each group has a continuum of voters of mass nj
with
3∑
j=1
nj = 1. We will treat group 3 as the majority group and groups 1 and 2 as
the minorities. Therefore n3 ∈ (0.33, 1). Voters have preferences over private transfers
made by the government. These transfers can be targeted at the level of groups but not
at the individual level. We represent individual preference of any voter in group j as:
Uj = U(fj)
where fj denotes per capita private transfers to the group j. The utility function is
strictly increasing and strictly concave i.e. U ′(fj) > 0 and U ′′(fj) < 0. To ensure interior
solution we further take that U ′(fj)→∞ as fj → 0. fj is completely determined by the
political processes of a country. Before election takes place, the two political parties A
and B simultaneously announce the group composition of the government that they will
form in the event of an election win. Therefore, we can define a group j’s representation
in the government promised by party h, Ghj , as simply the total number of government
positions announced by party h in favor of group j. A group’s promised representation
in the government, Ghj , determines how much per capita transfer voters of group j will
get if party h comes to power. We denote it by
fhj = f(G
h
j ) or G
h
j = f
−1(fhj ).
More representation in government is always beneficial for group members, i.e.,
f ′(Ghj ) > 0. Since representation in government determines the individual level payoff
of the voters, the political parties commit to allocation of government positions as their
platforms during the election. In the following analysis, we use fhj directly as a choice
variable of the parties instead of Ghj . Any voter i belonging to group j votes for party
A if:
U(fAj ) > U(f
B
j ) + δ + σi,j
where δ ∼ U [−1
2ψ
, 1
2ψ
] and σi,j ∼ U [ −12φj , 12φj ].
This is a standard probabilistic voting set up where δ can be interpreted as
population wide wave of support in favor of party B (relative to A). σi,j represents ideo-
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logical bias of a member i of group j towards party B. φj is a measure of responsiveness
of group j voters to private transfers determined through promised political representa-
tion by a party. Minority groups 1 and 2 are identical in their political responsiveness
to transfers i.e. φ1 = φ2 = φ and group 3 is more responsive to transfers compared
to the minorities i.e. φ3 > φ. This is an important assumption and is motivated by
the observation that the minorities often have stronger attachments to specific parties
owing to historical factors. Consequently, this makes them less pliable compared to the
majority group from the parties’ point of view.21 Values of ψ and φj are known to both
the parties. The government has a total budget which is exogenously fixed at S. Each
party h maximizes the probability of forming government ph by choosing fhj subject to
the budget constraint:
3∑
j=1
njf
h
j ≤ S
In proportional system ph is the probability that vote share is larger than 0.5, while in
the majoritarian system it is the probability of obtaining more than half of the electoral
districts. We assume that in majoritarian system there are K electoral districts with
equal population size. We denote by nkj the population share of group j relative to
population in district k. Therefore,
3∑
j=1
nkj = 1 for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K.
We compare equilibrium political representation in single district PR system with that
in K district MR voting system.
6.2 Equilibrium Characterization
Since the parties are symmetric, we have policy convergence in equilibrium, i.e., parties
choose the same equilibrium policy under both systems. The following two propositions
characterize the equilibrium allocation of resources (and hence, equilibrium representa-
tion) under the two systems.
21The African Americans in the USA, for example, are more attached to the Democratic Party and
would presumably respond less to promises of transfer of resources by the Republican Party. The
muslims in India, similarly, are historically associated with the Indian National Congress party and the
BJP, the other national party, would find it difficult to attract them using promises of public resource
allocation towards them.
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Proposition 1 Under a single district proportional representation voting system, group
size nj of a minority has no effect on equilibrium representation G∗j and equilibrium
transfer f ∗j . In equilibrium:
φjU
′(f ∗j ) = φlU
′(f ∗l ) ∀ j 6= l. (4)
Proof: See Appendix C.1.
Proposition 1 implies that under PR, minority groups 1 and 2 would receive
identical per capita transfers irrespective of their population shares, i.e., f ∗1 = f ∗2 for
all n1 and n2. To understand the result intuitively, let’s consider the case where group
1 is the larger minority, i.e., n1 > n2. Suppose that f1 and f2 are the initial transfers
promised by any party. Further, consider the party taking away  > 0 per capita
transfer from group 1 and reallocating it to group 2. The per capita transfer of group 2,
therefore, would increase by n1
n2
> . This highlights the fact that it is always cheaper
to increase per capita transfer of the smaller group. This reallocation, for a small ,
would cost the party n1φU
′
(f1) votes from group 1 and would increase votes from group
2 by n2φU
′
(f2)
n1
n2
. Since in PR the political parties maximize votes, the party would
prefer to reallocate as long as the gain and the loss from reallocation are different. It
is obvious that when f1 = f2, they equalize. Therefore, even though vote shares of the
smaller group are cheaper to buy, the return to a party for doing this (in terms of total
votes) is lower, precisely because the group is small. These two opposing forces balance
in other out in equilibrium, giving us the result.
Moreover, we get that the majority group gets higher per capita transfer com-
pared to minorities, i.e., f ∗3 > f ∗1 = f ∗2 . This is a direct result of our assumption that
majority group voters are easier to sway through electoral commitments and hence,
parties compete more fiercely for their votes.
The following result characterizes the equilibrium transfers in the MR system:
Proposition 2 Under the majoritarian voting system with K districts, the following
set of equations characterizes the equilibrium transfers (f ∗1 , f ∗2 , f ∗3 ) announced by both
parties:
φjU
′(f ∗j )
K∑
k=1
nkj/nj
3∑
j′=1
φj′n
k
j′
= φlU
′(f ∗l )
K∑
k=1
nkl /nl
3∑
j′=1
φj′n
k
j′
∀ j 6= l (5)
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Proof: See Appendix C.2.
We emphasize two aspects of the result above. Firstly, the characterization ev-
idently implies that the equilibrium representation and transfer to groups under the
MR system would generally depend on the population shares. Importantly, the transfer
would depend on distribution of groups across electoral districts, suggesting that settle-
ment patterns of groups across districts or over space would be important in determining
the exact nature of the relationship between group size and transfer. Moreover, if all
groups have the same responsiveness to transfers, i.e., if φ1 = φ2 = φ3, then equation
(5) collapses to equation (4). Therefore, heterogeneity in responsiveness across groups,
especially across majority and minority groups is critical for group size to matter in MR
systems.
We can rewrite equation (5) as the following:
φjU
′(f ∗j )
∑K
k=1 ω
knkj
nj
= φlU
′(f ∗l )
∑K
k=1 ω
knkl
nl
where ωk = [
3∑
j′=1
φj′n
k
j′ ]
−1
ωk is therefore the inverse of the average responsiveness of district k, and
∑K
k=1 ω
knkj
is the weighted average of the group j’s shares across districts with ωk as the weights.
Therefore, the proposition above states that in majoritarian system a group will get
higher political representation and private transfers relative to another group if it is
concentrated more in districts having a less responsive mass of voters, i.e., if the group
has a higher correlation between nkj and ωk. Since the majority group is the more
responsive one, it therefore follows that a minority group would gain if it is concentrated
more in districts with low majority group population. This happens because parties
in a MR system wish to win electoral districts (as opposed to votes). Therefore, if
a minority group is settled in districts where the majority group is relatively scarce,
the group becomes attractive to the political parties for the purposes of winning those
districts. This logic is going to play an important role in determining the nature of the
comparative static exercise we perform in the following section.
6.3 Comparative Statics
Our empirical exercise estimated the relationship between representation and group size
within a country-year observation, i.e., it compared multiple minorities within a country
(in a given year) and exploited the variation in their group sizes to generate the result.
Keeping parity with it, in this section we study the behavior of equilibrium representation
27
and transfer in MR for minorities of differing group sizes. Specifically, we see how the
equilibrium outcome variables change when we change the composition of n1 and n2
keeping the population share of the majority, n3 fixed. Our main comparative static
exercise will therefore look at the effect of changing n1 by keeping n3 constant. Now,
any change in the composition of population shares of minorities at the national level
would necessarily change their distribution across districts, i.e., the values of nk1 and nk2
for all k. Therefore, even though proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium for any
given profile of population shares of groups, it would be hard to comment on the nature
of the comparative static result without specifying how changes in the population shares
of groups relates to the consequent changes in their spatial distribution across electoral
districts. Below we provide a framework to incorporate this concern in our model.
We first normalize the total area of the country to 1. We denote by Aj the
measure of the area where group j has presence and we postulate that Aj = n
αj
j for
some αj ≥ 0.22 We assume that for group 3 (i.e., majority group) α3 = 0, or A3 = 1,
i.e., the majority group is dispersed all over the space in the country. For the groups 1
and 2, we consider two possibilities. In one case, we assume that α1 = α2 = α > 0, i.e.,
both minorities are geographically concentrated in some region of the country. In the
alternative scenario we allow group 2 to be dispersed and group 1 to be concentrated, i.e.,
α1 = α and α2 = 0.23 Importantly, for groups which are geographically concentrated,
we have α < 1, i.e., the area of settlement of a group has a concave relationship with
its population share. This assumption will turn out to be important for the result we
derive below. For mathematical simplicity we assume that group population is uniformly
distributed across its area of settlement.
Now we consider dividing the country in K equal sized electoral districts. We
note that in the case where both minorities are geographically concentrated, we will
have three types of districts: (i) group 3 is present with only one minority group in the
district, (ii) all the three groups present, and (iii) only group 3 present. The last type
of district will not be there if group 2 is also dispersed. For us the most important type
of district is the one where all groups are present. Since the majority group is present
everywhere, the proportion of this type of district will be determined by the overlap
region of the settlement areas of the two minorities. We denote by A1∩2 the measure
of the area where groups 1 and 2 overlap and correspondingly we define the overlap
22Note that the same space can have presence of multiple groups, and therefore, the sum of Ajs need
not be one. If groups overlap over space, the sum of Ajs would in fact be larger than one.
23If all groups are dispersed then the population distribution of groups in the country is replicated in
each of the districts individually and consequently, the result for MR collapses again to the PR case.
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coefficient (also known as the Szymkiewicz-Simpson coefficient) as:
O =
A1∩2
min{nα1 , nα2}
We, therefore, have O ∈ [0, 1]. With these objects defined, we state the main result that
establishes the relationship between group size and political representation for minorities
in MR systems.
Proposition 3 We state the results separately for the two cases that we consider:
1. If group 2 is geographically dispersed, equilibrium political representation of group
1, G∗1, follows an inverted U-shaped relation with n1 with the peak of political
representation at n∗1 = (1− α)
1
α .
2. If group 2 is also concentrated, then G∗1 follows an inverted U-shaped relation with
n1 with the peak of political representation at n∗1 =
(1−n3)
2
if and only if O > O∗ for
some O∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: See Appendix C.3.
The result implies that when both groups are concentrated, the equilibrium
representation and transfers of both groups have an inverted-U shaped relationship with
group size. The intuition behind this result follows from the discussion of proposition 2.
Our assumption about concave relationship between group population share and area
occupied implies that the total area occupied by the two minorities together would be
largest if they are equal sized (i.e., n1 = n2 = (1−n3)2 ). As their population shares diverge
from each other, i.e., as one becomes larger and the other smaller, their total settlement
area would fall. Now consider the type of electoral districts where all groups are present
(the type (ii) district, as mentioned above). Divergence in the population shares of
minorities away from the “mid-size” would imply that in those districts the relative
share of the majority group would go up, since this is the only type of district where
all groups are present. This, according to the discussion above, harms both minorities,
as they become concentrated in the districts with larger (relative) majority share. The
minority group which is getting smaller, therefore, loses out in both types (i) and (ii) of
districts. The group which is getting larger faces opposing forces on its representation.
It becomes more important in type (i) districts, but less important in type (ii) districts.
Therefore, overall getting larger in population share would harm the group if most of
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its population is settled in the type (ii) districts, i.e., if the overlap coefficient is high
enough.
An alternative way to think about it is to notice the fact that the concave rela-
tionship between population share and area occupied also implies that larger minorities,
on average, have higher population density than smaller ones. For minorities which are
not dispersed through out the country, there is an “optimal” density that maximizes
their presence across districts. If a minority is too dispersed then they become less
important everywhere. If they become too concentrated then their importance remain
clustered around few districts only. Our model shows that the large minorities suffer
from the latter problem by becoming “too large” in type (i) districts and “too small” in
type (ii) districts. It is apparent from our discussion that our main result for the MR
system is critically dependent on the concavity assumption and the inverted-U shaped
relationship is observed only for the minorities which are geographically concentrated.
We now go back to our data to verify whether this indeed is true.
7 Validation of the Model
In this section, we first empirically verify one key parameter restriction of the model
that we need for our main result. Proposition 3 requires the minority groups’ settlement
area to be inelastically related to their population shares. To test this assumption we
run the following specification:
lnSict = α lnnict + γXict + δct + c (6)
where Sict is the settlement area of a group i which is geographically concentrated in
country c in year t and nict is the population share that group. α therefore measures
the elasticity of settlement area with respect to population share of a group, and there-
fore, is a direct estimate of the parameter α in the model. The EPR dataset provides
information about the settlement area of groups which are geographically concentrated.
Therefore, we can estimate the equation (6). The results are reported in appendix table
A5. Column (1) reports the main estimate of α to be 0.625. It is statistically significant
and significantly lower than one at 1% level. This confirms our hypothesis. Further,
we estimate this parameter in two sub-samples—where the minority groups’ population
shares are smaller than 0.25 (column (2)) and smaller than 0.1 (column (3)). Both es-
timates are close to each other and are similar to the main estimate. This shows that
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Table 5: The pattern in MR is explained by geographical concentration
Political inclusion
(1) (2) (3)
Population share 4.825*** 1.910 3.324
(1.227) (1.609) (3.122)
Population share - squared -9.276** -1.864 -4.437
(3.955) (5.917) (6.917)
Proportional*Population share -3.661**
(1.721)
Proportional*Population share - squared 9.106*
(5.313)
Concentrated*population share 4.811*** -0.987
(1.610) (3.290)
Concentrated*population share - squared -11.67** 1.054
(5.589) (7.651)
Mean inclusion 0.366 0.447 0.265
Observations 8,706 4,830 3,876
R-squared 0.687 0.648 0.734
Ethnicity-year controls YES YES YES
Country-year FE YES YES YES
Notes: Data is at the level of ethnicity-country-year. Only minorities are part of the sam-
ple. Political inclusion is a dummy variable that takes value one if the group in a country
in a given year is neither powerless nor discriminated by the state. Column (1) replicates
the baseline result of column (4) in table 1. Column (2) uses only MR countries and col-
umn (3) uses only PR countries. Concentrated is a dummy variable that takes value one
if the group has a well-demarcated settlement area in a country. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the country level and reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
the elasticity of settlement area with respect to population share of a group is indeed
stable, further confirming our model’s assumption.
The primary aim of the model is to justify the empirical pattern established in
the Section 4 of the paper. The model, however, generates some additional predictions
regarding the exact nature of the relationship between group size and access to political
power. It is, therefore, important to test if these additional comparative static results
hold in order to verify if the proposed model is indeed valid. We now turn to that
discussion in the following paragraphs.
Proposition 3 states that we should observe the inverted U-shaped relationship
between group size and power status under the MR system only for groups which are
geographically concentrated. Also, a group’s geographic concentration should not matter
for the result of the PR system. We verify this by running the following specification
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Table 6: Predicted optimal minority size is smaller in countries with larger majority
Political inclusion
(1) (2) (3)
β1: Population share 3.741*** 5.130*** 7.531***
(1.297) (1.814) (2.159)
β2: Population share - squared -5.365 -7.732 -17.93***
(3.650) (5.362) (5.977)
β3: Proportional*Population share -2.607 -4.385* -7.838***
(1.787) (2.220) (2.553)
β4: Proportional*Population share - squared 5.324 9.334 21.95***
(5.160) (6.619) (7.421)
H0 : β1 + β3 = 0 (p-value) .377 .559 .857
H0 : β2 + β4 = 0 (p-value) .991 .640 .540
Predicted optimal size 0.349 0.332 0.210
Mean inclusion 0.286 0.214 0.156
Observations 6,917 5,750 3,871
R-squared 0.685 0.675 0.732
Ethnicity-year controls YES YES YES
Country-year FE YES YES YES
Notes: Data is at the level of ethnicity-country-year. Only minorities are part of the
sample. Political inclusion is a dummy variable that takes value one if the group in
a country in a given year is neither powerless nor discriminated by the state. Largest
group size in column (1) ≥ 0.3, in column (2) ≥ 0.5, and in column (3) ≥ 0.7. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
for the samples of MR and PR country-year observations separately:
Yict = δct + η1nict + η2n
2
ict + η3Cict ∗ nict + η4Cict ∗ n2ict + γXict + c (7)
where Cict is a dummy indicating whether the group i is geographically concentrated
in country c in year t. Proposition 3 implies that for the sample of MR countries, η1 and
η2 should be zero and we should have η3 > 0 and η4 < 0. For the set of PR countries
all the coefficients η1–η4 should be zero. Table 5 reports the results and the predictions
are verified. Column (1) reproduces the main result, and columns (2) and (3) provides
the estimates of η1–η4 for MR and PR countries, respectively. As is evident, for the MR
countries the relationship is only true for geographically concentrated groups. For PR
countries, none of the coefficients are statistically significant.
Proposition 3 further specifies that under the MR system, the peak political
representation is achieved when the population share of the group equals 1−n3
2
when the
group is geographically concentrated, where n3 is the population share of the majority
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group. Therefore, for larger values of the majority group’s share, the peak is achieved at
lower values of the minority group’s size. We test this prediction by running specification
(1) on various sub-samples of the data where we vary the size of the majority group.
The results are reported in table 6. Columns (1)–(3) report the results for sub-samples
where the majority group’s population share is larger than 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7, respectively.
The table also reports the population shares at which the peak inclusion is achieved.
We see that the population share at which the peak inclusion is achieved declines as we
move to countries with larger majority groups.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines how electoral systems influence the relation between population
share of a minority group and its access to power in the national government. We
empirically show robust causal evidence that in countries with the PR system, population
share of a minority has no effect on its political representation, while in countries with
MR the relationship is inverted U-shaped. We then provide a theoretical framework with
a multiple minority group set up that generates the same equilibrium predictions. We
finally validate the model by confirming a critical assumption that delivers the desired
result and then verifying the model’s additional comparative static results. Our results
imply that under PR, group size inequality does not translate into inequality in the
political representation of minorities and consequently, their welfare inequality would
also be minimal. On the other hand, power inequality among minorities in countries
with the MR system may be lower or higher than group size inequality depending on the
size distribution of the groups. It is the mid-sized minority groups that enjoy maximum
access to power in MR, while the small and large minorities enjoy similar levels of
representation. Our work further highlights the importance of settlement patterns of
groups in determining their representation in the government under the MR system.
We, however, take settlement patterns as exogenously given. One interesting line of
future enquiry can be to consider the settlement patterns of mobile minorities to be
endogenous and explore if electoral system influences the settlement decisions of such
minorities. We wish to take up this issue in our future work.
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A Additional Figures and Tables
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
All data Majoritarian system Proportional system Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Ethnicity level
Political inclusion 0.366 0.444 0.275 0.169
(0.482) (0.497) (0.446) (0.112)
Power rank 2.294 2.391 2.180 0.211
(0.793) (0.770) (0.806) (0.188)
Population share 0.074 0.070 0.079 -0.009
(0.099) (0.090) (0.108) (0.024)
Years peace 31.418 29.223 34.029 -4.806
(20.285) (19.178) (21.236) (4.162)
Aggregate settlement 0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.003
(0.046) (0.031) (0.059) (0.005)
Statewide settlement 0.032 0.026 0.040 -0.014
(0.176) (0.158) (0.195) (0.045)
Regional and urban settlement 0.381 0.416 0.339 0.077
(0.486) (0.493) (0.474) (0.114)
Urban settlement 0.087 0.103 0.067 0.036
(0.282) (0.305) (0.251) (0.061)
Regional settlement 0.369 0.325 0.421 -0.096
(0.482) (0.468) (0.494) (0.106)
Dispersed settlement 0.109 0.118 0.098 0.020
(0.312) (0.323) (0.298) (0.074)
Migrant settlement 0.020 0.011 0.031 -0.020
(0.140) (0.103) (0.174) (0.028)
Transethnic-kin inclusion 0.417 0.402 0.435 -0.033
(0.493) (0.490) (0.496) (0.103)
Transethnic-kin exclusion 0.521 0.460 0.594 -0.135
(0.500) (0.498) (0.491) ( 0.105)
Fraction largest religion 0.719 0.750 0.682 0.069
(0.209) (0.222) (0.186) (0.053)
Fraction largest language 0.879 0.889 0.867 0.023
(0.223) (0.214) (0.232) (0.045)
Observations 9,294 5,049 4,245 9,294
Panel B: Country level
Ethnic fractionalization 2.433 2.885 2.079 0.806
(1.989) (2.201) (1.723) (0.494)
Number of relevant groups 4.596 5.470 3.913 1.557
( 3.772) (4.221) (3.221) (0.944)
Largest group size 0.735 0.687 0.772 -0.086
(0.219) (0.238) (0.195) (0.054)
Absolute majority 0.849 0.753 0.923 -0.170*
(0.359) (0.432) (0.266) (0.086)
Competitiveness of participation 3.989 3.873 4.079 -0.207
(1.056) (1.252) (0.962) (0.232)
Constraints chief executive 6.121 5.978 6.233 -0.256
(1.291) (1.370) (1.497) (0.270)
Observations 2,601 1,141 1,460 2,601
Notes: The data is at the ethnicity-country-year level for 438 ethno-country groups in Panel A and country-
year level for 102 countries in Panel B for the period 1946–2013. Standard deviation in parenthesis in columns
(1), (2) and (3). Standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis in the last column. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table A2: Inverted U-shaped relation under MR and no relation under PR
Political inclusion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
β1: Population share 2.839*** 2.198*** 4.405*** 4.825***
(0.450) (0.279) (1.239) (1.227)
β2: Population share - squared -7.884** -9.276**
(3.883) (3.955)
β3: Proportional*Population share -1.503*** -1.205** -3.011* -3.661**
(0.559) (0.489) (1.687) (1.721)
β4: Proportional*Population share - squared 6.903 9.106*
(5.159) (5.313)
Proportional 0.216* 0.195 0.247*
(0.126) (0.126) (0.144)
Years peace 0.00437*** 0.00409*** 0.00415***
(0.00154) (0.00135) (0.00130)
Aggregate settlement 0.556*** 0.549*** 0.541***
(0.0997) (0.110) (0.114)
Statewide settlement 0.329 0.294 0.139
(0.333) (0.375) (0.352)
Regional and urban settlement 0.195*** 0.174** 0.170**
(0.0740) (0.0784) (0.0789)
Urban settlement -0.00516 0.0180 0.00905
(0.0653) (0.0663) (0.0650)
Regional settlement -0.0143 -0.0105 -0.00942
(0.0517) (0.0488) (0.0483)
Migrant settlement -0.146 -0.140 -0.150
(0.197) (0.195) (0.195)
Transethnic-kin inclusion 0.00805 0.00421 0.000118
(0.0434) (0.0446) (0.0477)
Transethnic-kin exclusion 0.103*** 0.0897** 0.103***
(0.0380) (0.0347) (0.0348)
Fraction largest religion -0.145 -0.125 -0.108
(0.109) (0.109) (0.105)
Fraction largest language 0.155** 0.193** 0.210***
(0.0627) (0.0737) (0.0748)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.0282 0.0203
(0.0239) (0.0251)
Number of relevant groups 0.0146 0.0123
(0.0197) (0.0197)
Competitiveness of participation 0.00705 0.00848
(0.0158) (0.0166)
Constraints chief executive -0.0149 -0.0169
(0.00960) (0.0104)
H0 : β1 + β3 = 0 (p-value) .000 .022 .231 .325
H0 : β2 + β4 = 0 (p-value) – – .774 .960
Predicted optimal size – – 0.279 0.260
Mean inclusion 0.367 0.367 0.366 0.366
Observations 9,304 9,294 9,294 8,706
R-squared 0.591 0.645 0.652 0.687
Country FE YES YES YES NO
Year FE YES YES YES NO
Country-year FE NO NO NO YES
Notes: Data is at the level of ethnicity-country-year. Only minorities are part of the sample. There are
87 countries and 421 ethno-country groups for the period 1946–2013 in column (4). Political inclusion is
a dummy variable that takes value one if the group in a country in a given year is neither powerless nor
discriminated by the state. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table A4: IV results: Full sample
Panel A: Second stage
Political inclusion ln(Nightlight per area)
(1) (2)
β1: Population share 5.823*** 5.307
(1.660) (8.759)
β2: Population share - squared -11.79** -8.388
(4.994) (20.48)
β3: Proportional*Population share -6.262** 19.23
(2.482) (16.39)
β4: Proportional*Population share - squared 18.88* -73.32
(9.990) (47.51)
H0 : β1 + β3 = 0 (p-value) 0.76 0.02
H0 : β2 + β4 = 0 (p-value) 0.37 0.03
Predicted optimal size 0.247 0.316
Observations 5,047 2,226
R-squared 0.702 0.765
Ethnicity-year controls YES YES
Country-year FE YES YES
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 2.42 1.89
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat 432.12 183.47
F stat (Proportional*Population share ) 193.93 106.45
F stat (Proportional*Population share - squared) 543.95 325.80
Panel B: Country level
Proportional
Colonialist proportional 0.463***
(0.118)
Mean dependent .450
Observations 1,309
R-squared 0.388
Region-year FE YES
Notes: Data is at the level of ethnicity-country-year. Only minorities are part of the sample. Political
inclusion is a dummy variable that takes value one if the group in a country in a given year is neither
powerless nor discriminated by the state. The dependent variable in column (3) of Panel A is loga-
rithm of nightlight luminosity per unit area of groups which have well-demarcated settlement areas.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: Settlement Area Expands Inelastically: α < 1
ln(Settlement area)
(1) (2) (3)
α: ln(Population share) 0.625*** 0.661*** 0.668***
(0.122) (0.134) (0.124)
H0 : α ≥ 1 (one tailed p-value) .001 .007 .005
Mean dependent 10.140 10.006 9.783
Observations 6,665 5,946 4,357
R-squared 0.792 0.779 0.742
Country-year FE YES YES YES
Notes: Data is at the level of ethnicity-country-year. Only minorities are part of
the sample. All concentrated minorities are in column (1). Minority population
share in column (2) ≤ 0.25 and that in column(3) ≤ 0.10. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(a) IV Estimation (b) Same Group Across Countries
Figure A6: Marginal Effect of Group Size on Political Inclusion
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B Panel Analysis
We report the results of specification (2) in table B1. We take relative population share
as the independent variable to control for change in population share of the majority
group as a consequence of change in population share of a minority. Columns (1) and
(4) report the results for our two main dependent variables using the full sample. We see
that the coefficients β3 and β4 for column (1) do not have the expected signs and all the
coefficients are noisily estimated. The coefficients for the nightlight regression (column
4) do have the expected signs. The magnitudes of β1 and β2 imply that group size
has an inverted-U shaped relationship with nightlight intensity in MR countries, though
the standard errors of the coefficients are high. The coefficients β3 and β4 have the
opposite signs, implying that the relationship is flatter for PR. Since annual variations
in population share would not immediately translate to changes in representation or
material welfare, we keep in sample every third (columns 2 and 5) and fifth (columns
3 and 6) year that a group is present in the data. We see that the all coefficients for
political inclusion have the expected signs in column (3), though the magnitude of β3
is smaller than β1. The coefficients for the nightlight regressions in column (5) and (6)
maintain their correct signs. The coefficients for the interaction terms are, however,
smaller in magnitudes. The panel results indicate that the relationship observed for
minorities within a country-year becomes less precise when we follow the same minority
over the years. This is expected given our discussion in section 4.
Table B1: Panel Analysis Produces Similar Patterns
Political Inclusion ln(Nightlight per area)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(β1): Relative population share 1.547 1.513 2.127 9.835 31.62** 18.96
(1.749) (1.290) (1.741) (9.883) (15.07) (12.96)
(β2): Relative population share-squared -1.020 -1.068 -1.487 -6.674 -21.80** -11.14
(1.271) (0.963) (1.252) (6.865) (10.15) (9.354)
(β3): Proportional*relative population share 0.420 0.0847 -0.199 -3.760** -4.417*** -4.998**
(0.925) (0.725) (0.762) (1.650) (1.527) (2.091)
(β4): Proportional*relative population share-squared -0.207 0.367 0.933 6.624 9.091** 9.362
(0.825) (0.651) (0.781) (4.671) (3.856) (5.922)
H0 : β1 + β3 = 0 (p-value) 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.52 0.06 0.27
H0 : β2 + β4 = 0 (p-value) 0.17 0.37 0.66 0.99 0.13 0.85
Observations 9,289 2,979 1,695 3,748 1,194 648
R-squared 0.918 0.921 0.930 0.990 0.992 0.993
Ethnicity-country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Data is at the level of ethnicity-country-year. Only minorities are part of the sample. Relative population share is
the ratio of population share of the group and the population share of the largest group in the country-year observation.
Political inclusion is a dummy variable that takes value one if the group in a country in a given year is neither powerless
nor discriminated by the state. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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C Proofs of Propositions
C.1 Proof of proposition 1
Consider the case of party A. Vote share of party A among members of group j is given
by:
piA,j = Pr[U(f
A
j ) > U(f
B
j ) + δ + σi,j]
Assuming that ψ ≥ φj for all j, we get:
piA,j =
1
2
+ φj[U(f
A
j )− U(fBj )− δ]
Party A will win elections if more than half the population votes for it. Probability of
winning for party A is given by:
pA = Pr[
3∑
j=1
njpiA,j
3∑
j=1
nj
>
1
2
]
This can simply be written as:
pA =
1
2
+
ψ
3∑
j=1
φjnj(U(f
A
j )− U(fBj ))
3∑
j=1
φjnj
Thus, party A solves:
max
fAj ≥0
pA =
1
2
+
ψ
3∑
j=1
φjnj(U(f
A
j )− U(fBj ))
3∑
j=1
φjnj
s.t.
3∑
j=1
njf
A
j ≤ S
Solving the above optimization problem gives the equilibrium condition in (1).
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C.2 Proof of proposition 2
In a K district majoritarian election, probability of winning for party A in constituency
k, as can be seen from the result under proportional electoral system, is given by:
pkA =
1
2
+
ψ
3∑
j=1
φjn
k
j (U(f
A
j )− U(fBj ))
3∑
j=1
φjnkj
Party A will win the election if it wins more than half the votes in more than half
the districts. If both parties win in equal number of districts, then the winner will be
chosen randomly. Party A solves the following optimization problem under majoritarian
elections:
max
fAj ≥0
pA s.t.
3∑
j=1
njf
A
j ≤ S
Since the parties are symmetric, in equilibrium, pkA =
1
2
for all districts. Thus, given a
district k, we denote the probability of winning in any other given district, with a slight
abuse of notation, as p−kA . When K=2, Probability of winning can be written as:
pA = p
k
Ap
−k
A +
1
2
[pkA(1− p−kA ) + p−kA (1− pkA)]
This can be simplified to:
=
1
2
pkA +
1
4
And when K>2, probability of winning is:
pA =
K−1∑
i=bK/2c
(
K − 1
i
)
pkA(p
−k
A )
i(1− p−kA )K−1−i
+
K−1∑
i=bK/2c+1
(
K − 1
i
)
(1− pkA)(p−kA )i(1− p−kA )K−1−i
+
1
2
[
1 + (−1)K
2
][
(
K − 1
bK/2c − 1
)
pkA(p
−k
A )
(K/2)−1(1− p−kA )K/2
+
(
K − 1
bK/2c
)
(p−kA )
K/2(1− p−kA )(K/2)−1(1− pkA)]
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This can be simplified to:
pA =
1
2K−1
[
(
K − 1
bK/2c
)
pkA +
K−1∑
i=bK/2c+1
(
K − 1
i
)
]
+
1
2K
[
1 + (−1)K
2
][(
(
K − 1
bK/2c − 1
)
−
(
K − 1
bK/2c
)
)pkA +
(
K − 1
bK/2c
)
]
Using this, we calculate:
dpA
dpkA
= C(K) = (
1 + (−1)K−1
2
)
(
K − 1
bK/2c
)
1
2K−1
+ (
1 + (−1)K
2
)
(
K
bK/2c
)
1
2K
For the first order condition to the optimization problem, we need to calculate:
dpA
dfAj
=
K∑
k=1
dpA
dpkA
dpkA
dfAj
Substituting the expression for dpA/dpkA, we can write this as:
dpA
dfAj
= C(K)
K∑
k=1
dpkA
dfAj
We can now easily solve the optimization problem to give the equilibrium condition given
in (2). Consider the case where all groups are equally responsive to electoral promises
i.e. φj = φ for all j. Since
3∑
j=1
nkj = 1 for all k and
K∑
k=1
nkj/nj = K for all j, (2) can be
simplified to:
U ′(f ∗i ) = U
′(f ∗l ) ∀i, l
Now, consider the case where nkj = nj for all k. In this case, (2) can be simplified to:
φiU
′(f ∗i ) = φlU
′(f ∗l ) ∀i, l
Both the above special cases indicate that when groups are evenly distributed across
districts or when all groups are equally responsive to electoral promises, majoritarian
elections give the same equilibrium political representation and per capita transfers as
the proportional representation system.
C.3 Proof of proposition 3
(a) When group 2 is concentrated, we have four types of constituencies based on the
identity of groups residing in them: (1) Only group 1 and 3 reside (2) Only group 2
and 3 reside (3) Group 1, 2 and 3 all reside (4) Only group 3 resides. Densities Dm of
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constituency type m are:
D1 = n1−α1 + n3 D
2 = n1−α2 + n3 D
3 = n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 + n3 D
4 = n3
Since constituencies have equal populations:
Dmam =
1
K
∀m
Where am is the area per consituency for each type m. Using this we get:
a1 =
1
K(n1−α1 + n3)
a2 =
1
K(n1−α2 + n3)
a3 =
1
K(n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 + n3)
a4 =
1
K(n3)
Number of consituencies Km of each type can be calculated by dividing total area of
occupied by all constituencies of a given type by am:
K1 = K(nα1 −O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α1 + n3)
K2 = K(nα2 −O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α2 + n3)
K3 = K(O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α1 + n1−α2 + n3)
K4 = K(1− nα1 − nα2 +O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n3)
Proportion of group i in constituency of type m nmi :
n11 =
n1−α1
n1−α1 + n3
n21 = 0 n
3
1 =
n1−α1
n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 + n3
n41 = 0
n12 = 0 n
2
2 =
n1−α2
n1−α2 + n3
n32 =
n1−α2
n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 + n3
n42 = 0
n13 =
n3
n1−α1 + n3
n23 =
n3
n1−α2 + n3
n33 =
n3
n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 + n3
n43 = 1
For simplicity, let U(fj) = log(fj). Therefore, U ′(fj) = 1fj . Similar to the proof of
proposition 2, we can obtain the first order conditions at equilibrium as:
γf1 =Kφ(n
α
1 −O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α1 + n3)(
n−α1
φn1−α1 + φ3n3
)
+Kφ(O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α1 + n1−α2 + n3)(
n−α1
φ(n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 ) + φ3n3
)
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γf2 =Kφ(n
α
2 −O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α2 + n3)(
n−α2
φn1−α2 + φ3n3
)
+Kφ(O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α1 + n1−α2 + n3)(
n−α2
φ(n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 ) + φ3n3
)
γf3 =Kφ3(n
α
1 −O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α1 + n3)(
1
φn1−α1 + φ3n3
)
+Kφ3(n
α
2 −O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α2 + n3)(
1
φn1−α2 + φ3n3
)
+Kφ3(O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α1 + n1−α2 + n3)(
1
φ(n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 ) + φ3n3
)
+Kφ3(1− nα1 − nα2 +O ·min(n1, n2)α)(
1
φ3
)
n1f1 + n2f2 + n3f3 = S
The equilibrium value of per capita private transfers to group 1:
f1 =
Sγf1
n1γf1 + n2γf2 + n3γf3
Calculating the denominator of the above expression using the first order conditions we
get:
n1γf1 + n2γf2 + n3γf3 =K(n
α
1 −O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α1 + n3)(
φn1−α1 + φ3n3
φn1−α1 + φ3n3
)
+K(nα2 −O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α2 + n3)(
φn1−α2 + φ3n3
φn1−α2 + φ3n3
)
+K(O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n1−α1 + n1−α2 + n3)(
φ(n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 ) + φ3n3
φ(n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 ) + φ3n3
)
+K(1− nα1 − nα2 +O ·min(n1, n2)α)(n3)(
φ3n3
φ3n3
)
=K(n1 + n2 + n3) = K
When n1 < n2, we get from first order condition:
f1
Sφ
=
γf1
Kφ
=
1−O
w1
+
O
w3
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Where,
w1 = φ+
(φ3 − φ)(n3)
n1−α1 + n3
w3 = φ+
(φ3 − φ)(n3)
n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 + n3
Derivative of w1 and w3 w.r.t. n1:
w′1 = −
(1− α)(φ3 − φ)n3n−α1
(n1−α1 + n3)2
w′3 = −
(1− α)(φ3 − φ)n3(n−α1 − n−α2 )
(n1−α1 + n
1−α
2 + n3)
2
As we can see w′1 < 0 and w′3 < 0 when n1 < n2. Therefore,
df1
dn1
< 0 in this case.
When n1 ≥ n2, we can rewrite the first order condition as:
f1
Sφ
=
γf1
Kφ
=
1−Or
w1
+
Or
w3
Where,
r = (n2/n1)
α, r′ = −αr( 1
n1
+
1
n2
), r ∈ [0, 1]
Differentiating:
1
Sφ
df1
dn1
=
−(1−Or)w′1
w21
+Or′(
1
w3
− 1
w1
) +
−(Or)w′3
w23
The first additive term on the R.H.S. is positive and the second and third terms are
negative. It can be seen that df1
dn1
is strictly decreasing in O and is positive as O tends to
0. Therefore, to prove that the expression df1
dn1
< 0 when O > O∗ for some O∗ ∈ (0, 1),
it is sufficient to show tha df1
dn1
< 0 when O = 1. Substituting O =1 and rearranging the
above expression, we need to show:
−(1− r)w
′
1
w21
< −r′( 1
w3
− 1
w1
) +
rw′3
w23
Substituting the values of w1, w2, w′1, w′3, r, r’ and simplifying, our expression is reduced
to:
z − 1
z
<
α(n2/n1 + 1)
(1− α)(1− (n2/n1)α)
Where z = 1 + φn
1−α
2
φn1−α1 +n3
=⇒ φn1−α2 (2 +
φn1−α2
φn1−α1 + φ3n3
) <
α(n2/n1 + 1)(φ(n
1−α
1 + n
1−α
2 ) + φ3n3)
(1− α)(1− (n2/n1)α)
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As the ratio φ3
φ
increases, the above inequality will be satisfied more easily. Therefore,
it is sufficient to show that weak inequality holds in the above expression when φ3 = φ.
Using this and rearranging, we now need to show:
(n1−α1 n
1−α
2 )(2 +
n1−α2
n1−α1 + n3
) ≤ α(n1 + n2)(n
1−α
1 + n
1−α
2 + n3)
(1− α)(nα1 − nα2 )
This can be rearranged to give:
n3−2α1 X + n
2−α
1 n3Y ≤ 0
Where,
X = (2− 3α)q1−α − (2− α)q − α− αq2−α
Y = (2− 3α)q1−α − (2− α)q − α− αq2−α − α(1 + q + n3
n1−α1
(1 + q))
q =
n2
n1
, q ∈ [0, 1]
As we can see, Y < X and n3 can take any value in (0, 1), therefore it is both necessary
and sufficient to show that X ≤ 0. In fact, it is sufficient to show that:
x(q, α) = (2− 3α)q1−α − (2− α)q − α ≤ 0 ∀q ∈ [0, 1], α ∈ (0, 1)
Since x is continuous in q, the above condition will hold if it can be shown to hold at
the boundaries and at each critical point in (0,1). At the boundaries:
x(0, α) = −α < 0
x(1, α) = −3α < 0
At critical point q∗:
dx(q, α)
dq
= (1− α)(2− 3α)q−α − 2 + α = 0
=⇒ q∗ = ((1− α)(2− 3α)
2− α )
∴ q∗ ∈ (0, 1) only when α ∈ (0, 2
3
). Substituting the value of q∗ and simplifying we need
to show:
x(q∗, α) = α((
1− α
2− α)
1−α
α (2− 3α) 1α − 1) ≤ 0
=⇒ (2− α
1− α)
1−α ≥ 2− 3α
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Let t = 1− α. Now we need to show:
y(t) = (1 +
1
t
)t − 3t+ 1 ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ (1
3
, 1)
Again, since y(t) is continuous in t, we only need to show that the above condition is
true at the boundary points and at each critical point in (1
3
, 1). At the boundaries:
y(
1
3
) = 4
1
3 > 0
y(1) = 0
At the critical point:
dy(t)
dt
= (1 +
1
t
)t(ln(1 +
1
t
)− 1
1 + t
)− 3 = 0
Substituting the value of (1 + 1
t
)t in y(t) and rearranging sides, we now need to show:
(3t− 1)(ln(1 + 1
t
)− 1
1 + t
) ≤ 3
Since t ∈ (1
3
, 1), therefore:
3t− 1 < 2 ln(1 + 1
t
) < ln(4)
1
1 + t
>
1
2
∴(3t− 1)(ln(1 + 1
t
)− 1
1 + t
) < 2(ln(4)− 1
2
) = 1.77 < 3
This implies that x(q∗, α) ≤ 0. Thus, x(q, t) ≤ 0. Therefore, when n1 ≥ n2, df1dn1 < 0 if
and only if O > O∗ for some O∗ ∈ (0, 1).
(b) When group 2 is dispersed, settlement areas of each group are:
A1 = n
α
1 A2 = 1 A3 = 1
In this case, there are two types of constituencies: (1) Group 1, 2 and 3 all reside and
(2) Only group 2 and 3 reside. Densities of constituencies are:
D1 = n1−α1 + n2 + n3 D
2 = n2 + n3
Since the populations across the K constituency are equal, we can calculate area per
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constituency:
a1 =
1
K(n1−α1 + n2 + n3)
a2 =
1
K(n1 + n2)
Number of constituencies of each type:
K1 = Knα1 (n
1−α
1 + n2 + n3) K
2 = K(1− nα1 )(n2 + n3)
Group proportions in each constituency type:
n11 =
n1−α1
n1−α1 + n2 + n3
n21 = 0
n12 =
n2
n1−α1 + n2 + n3
n22 =
n2
n2 + n3
n13 =
n3
n1−α1 + n2 + n3
n23 =
n3
n2 + n3
Again, taking U(fj) = ln(fj), we get first order conditions. At equilibrium:
γf1 = Kφ(n
α
1 )(n
1−α
1 + n2 + n3)
n−α1
φ(n1−α1 + n2) + φ3n3
γf2 =Kφ(n
α
1 )(n
1−α
1 + n2 + n3)
1
φ(n1−α1 + n2) + φ3n3
+Kφ(1− nα1 )(n2 + n3)
1
φn2 + φ3n3
γf3 =Kφ3(n
α
1 )(n
1−α
1 + n2 + n3)
1
φ(n1−α1 + n2) + φ3n3
+Kφ3(1− nα1 )(n2 + n3)
1
φn2 + φ3n3
n1f1 + n2f2 + n3f3 = S
Similar to the proof of proposition 3, equilibrium per capita transfer to group 2 are:
f1 =
Sγf1
n1γf1 + n2γf2 + n3γf3
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Calculating the denominator by substituting values from first order condition:
n1γf1 + n2γf2 + n3γf3 =K(n
α
1 )(n
1−α
1 + n2 + n3)
φ(n1−α1 + n2) + φ3n3
φ(n1−α1 + n2) + φ3n3
+
K(1− nα1 )(n2 + n3)
φn2 + φ3n3
φn2 + φ3n3
=K(n1 + n2 + n3) = K
Using this and the first order condition:
f1
Sφ
=
γf1
Kφ
=
n1−α1 + n2 + n3
φ(n1−α1 + n2) + φ3n3
Differentiating and simplifying:
1
Sφ
df1
dn1
=
(φ3 − φ)n3((1− α)n−α1 − 1)
(φ(n1−α1 + n2) + φ3n3)2
Since, φ3 > φ, it follows:
df1
dn1
> 0 if n1 < (1− α) 1α
df1
dn1
< 0 if n1 > (1− α) 1α
∴ There is an inverted U-shaped relation between n1 and f ∗1 and hence between n1 and
G∗1 with peak at n∗1 = (1− α)
1
α .
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